THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VALUE OF CHILDREN IN PHILIPPINE SOCIETY

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The argument on the value or disvalue of children has long been an issue in both sociological and demographic fields. This paper briefly reviews the two sides of this issue and offers a critique of the "disvalue hypothesis" in terms of Caldwell's theory of fertility decline in developing nations and in terms of the true nature of subsistence living in both rural and urban environs of Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines. The issue of the value of children needs to be viewed from an anthropological perspective in light of the on-going Scott-Popkin debate.

Scientific concern and discussion of fertility and population trends erupted in 1960s, drawing on literary and statistical data, traditional anthropological, sociological and demographic methods, and consisted of both large- and small-scale studies of fertility, breast-feeding, and associated problems. In many such empirically-based studies, however, there was often little attempt to get beneath the surface organization and discover the underlying structures of Philippine society which controlled the solution to population problems, and to locate the value of family planning of both natives and agencies within the structured economic and social realities which so often in Southeast Asia encourage couples to have large families.

Most such studies (eg. Pal 1963; Guthrie & Jacobs 1966; Castillo and Pua 1963; Pablo 1966; Nurge 1966; and Reyes-Makil and Simpson-Hebert 1985) failed to come to terms with the frustrations met in planning population controls, and to understand why natives persist, for either practical reasons or "desire," in "excessive" breeding. They failed to adequately account for how and why contraceptive methods of – and imposed by – the west ignored social, cultural and economic (i.e. poverty or subsistence) conditions (also often created by the west), which warranted an already strong and extensive kinship system to disperse and alleviate the burden, and in fact enhance the value of, children. Plus there was a failure to take into account a cultural milieu where masculinity/femininity is closely tied to having children, and where the local language often lacks even the words to describe the scientific understanding of reproduction – or the western methods devised to prevent it, simultaneously ignoring the natives' own concepts of physiology and reproductive-contraceptive medicine.

Consequently, although much has been written on the value/disvalue of children in Third World cultures, almost all have taken a functionalist or economic perspective. Neglect of the symbolic meaning of the centrality of children (cf. Gudeman 1971) has resulted; so too has there been a neglect of the interrelations between family, kinship and fertility coping behavior: how the family serves as an intermediary between the cultural system and the individual, shaping the latter's perception of kinship duties and obligations, assists in sheer survival and reproduction, and influencing one's family-building processes. There was also an overall failure to identify some of the social institutions and value systems that encourage large families, and to understand patterns of interaction between spouses, families, relatives, friends and neighbours.

Research Issues

In this paper, I wish to raise and touch upon such issues as: how children are integrated into, and are valuable to, the Philippine bilateral kinship system which, fully recognizing children as assets or contributors to the welfare of society, sanctions and supports appropriate reproductive behavior; how and why Filipinos spread the costs of child-rearing and maximize their socio-economic gains; how such mechan-

isms, often ignored by family-planners, have worked to sustain population growth; why children occupy a central position, both structurally and in actuality; and how they are distributed through the larger kinship system.

But here I must raise two points: first, when one speaks of "maximization of economic gains" in Philippine (or peasant) society, one needs to consider Scott's (1976) argument that the natives' concept of "maximum" may mean "minimum of risk," i.e. maximization to an acceptable, subsistence level, and not the often misconstrued western capitalist-imposed idea of greatest profit before the onset of declining marginal returns.[1] As I argue, children are primarily valuable because they can sustain themselves, and therefore are not a burden on parents, and that they can (and do) repay the initial parental investment or outlay in them; but their real value lies in that, over and beyond their initial costs and their ability of self-sustenance, they offer the potential (and often the actuality) of (marginally) contributing to the family and/or household subsistence. It is in fortuitous cases not uncommon, that a child may clearly profit (i.e., more than marginally) his/her family.

Second, given that there are few or no alternative investment opportunities, or other social security measures available in peasant societies, children are obviously economically attractive. But this economic determinism fails to account for the pivotal role children seem to play in bridging various relationships – those between mother-father, parents-society, parents-grandparents, family and kin network, and, as an exemplary case, between parents and fictive kin. Why is the child the focal member in a family, apart from the obvious economic and functional reasons?

Although I cannot even begin to deal with all these issues in this paper within an anthropological framework, I would like to present an argument that suggests that children are still an economic and social asset to parents in an urbanizing and transitional society such as the Philippines, and thereby high fertility is (still) rational; and to show how certain social factors interplay with the economic.

The value and econmic roles of children in peasant or underdeveloped societies have long been an issue with regard to their advantages – and hence net economic gains (value) to their families – as opposed to the disadvantages of high fertility, and thereby the net cost (disvalue) of children. This issue has created two main camps amongst social scientists, especially demographers, represented for our purposes in the former case by Caldwell, and in the latter by Mueller.

Whereas in modern industrialized societies, savings and consumer credit enables couples or families to transfer purchasing power from periods of lesser needs to periods of greater needs, so too in peasant societies, saving and borowing are commonly used to bring consumption flows into line with changing needs.

On this basis of savings and assistance, Mueller (1976, for example) has perceived the value of children as primarily providing assistance of a direct economic nature to their families according to the changing needs or life-cycle of the family, particularly in times of crises. The perceived economic value of children in less developed societies stems from the expectation that children will help parents when the latter have deficits in old age, periods of sickness, or emergencies. As a form of insurance, children may be seen as expensive because of the family or parental investment required in child-raising. The investment in, and returns from, the life-cycle of the family and children, taken together, shows – according to Mueller (1976:148) – that children are a net loss (disvalue) to the family or parents, and subsequently high fertility is disadvantageous.

Mueller goes on to say that up until children become parents themselves they consume more than they produce, or at least until they reach the ages of 15-19 years; and that their contribution of work is not large enough to prevent them from being an economic burden on peasant society. In fact, according to Mueller, it appears that in most developing countries children under 15 years do little productive work relative to adults; or alternatively, she goes on, children may do productive work but it tends

to be substitute and not additional work: adult men may gain leisure by having large families, while women may be freed from the market place; in the limiting case, work by children may be merely substitute work for work by others in the household; and that raising a large number of children would seem to be an expensive method of providing a relatively minor aggregate for old age support (Mueller 1976: *passim;* cf. Caldwell 1982: 11-2; and Ohlin 1971: 1724).

There have been numerous critiques (eg. Caldwell 1982, Ware 1978; Hull 1975) of this line of enquiry and subsequent conclusions. But in this paper, by focusing on the more positive aspects of the value of children, I am able to offer a critique of Mueller's (1976) conclusions in terms of those very aspects she had neglected.

Mueller, and like-minded social scientists, overlook the complexity of the kinship and social structures, and the entanglement of indirect or non-economic values of children, by their focus primarily on the direct economic aspects, often with an ethnocentric perspective.

For example, to calculate the economic value of children only up to the time they become parents themselves – i.e., during their productive years of about 15-25 – implies that children before or afterwards make no return to their parents. Caldwell (1982: 105) suggests that to focus only on this short productive period of the offspring is to assume that parental support during child-rearing must be of the nature of a purely economic investment. If this assumption was valid then cheaper ways or State apparatuses would achieve the same return.

But this assumption is not valid, as I will endeavor to show; and concurring with Caldwell, I suggest that value-of-children studies often fail to understand the production and consumption side of subsistence living and to take into account market activities other than the sale of staples (Caldwell 1982: 105):

> It is a failure to understand societies where the distinctions are much less clear than in advanced industrial societies between producers and consumers and between the hours of the week devoted to production and those devoted to consumption.

In view of these factors, investment in children is probably an investment is not merely economic, but in the real and total sense of the term (Caldwell 1982: 108; see also Ware 1978: 16), i.e., it is a productive and social investment.

But this sense of the term does not come about because there is any correlation between giving assistance to a specific child and receiving help back from that child. It comes about because greater financial help to capable children may allow them to reach the urban white-collar occupations or beyond. If they reach such heights, they will in most cases return more money and remit more regularly (Caldwell 1982: 108). That is, investment in children entails not only a norm of reciprocity, but also implies risks and returns-with-interest. The risk is that not all children are sufficiently gifted to give an adequate return on educational investment, or willing to do so, or achieve sufficient success to provide their parents with a channel to the modern world; it is very much a "lucky dip". Hence high fertility is needed to shorten the odds on success in that lucky dip (Caldwell 1982: 44 cf. Ohlin 1971: 1723).

But the returns with interest can be great. Children on average are reported to remit money to parents amounting to about 10 percent of both father's income and household income; among those who remit at all the reported proportion is about 15 percent. For perhaps half of all parents the number of remitters may eventually be three or more per household, thus increasing parental income by half (Caldwell 1982: 108).

However, such analysis may hide much of the return on the investment. The monetary return may be understated, and the non-monetary returns may well outweigh the monetary ones. Also, the successful investment buys security where the child obtains employment with guaranteed tenure and regular salary that will permit help no matter what the crisis (Caldwell 1982: 109).

The fact is, there are few other competitive sources of investment for rural or urban poor

populations which give adequate returns (Caldwell 1982:108-91) that are almost immediate, on-going and long-term. In this context an important ques-rural or urban underdeveloped areas is their experience of financial institutions. There is something about the structure of financial relations in the life of the village peasant or urban poor which makes it difficult for people to store wealth for their future needs (Hull 1975: 163). Peasant farming offers few outlets for extra money in contrast to extra labor; usury may be practised by some farmers, but it is more a specialty of the business person. Money may be safely invested in a small business, but only if that business is run by a competent and trusted relative. More land can be acquired with money, but it can only be profitably used if farmed by near kin, particularly children or a spouse. These are not restrictions which favor lower fertility (Caldwell 1982: 109).

Savings may be held in the form of jewellery, especially gold, or some precious commodity such as cloth; when a family needs cash these items may be readily pawned or sold in the marketplace. People may also join a rotating credit association, from which they may borrow or use as collateral (see Hull 1975: 164). For relatively small or short-term loans, people might rely on their neighbors and friends, whereas larger loans may be made through a bank branch (Caldwell 1982:163-4; see also Castillo and others 1968:29).

Banks also provide facilities for interest-bearing savings account, but what pauper can afford regular deposits or resist the temptation to withdraw? And while in industrialized societies these financial institutions provide secure caches for wealth and involve little cost, and while theoretically available to everyone, memories of such institutions' instability weigh heavily against their reputation (Hull 1975: 163). A pattern can thus be seen for a variety of financial institutions being available for both long- and short-term transactions; but the level of economic well-being of families, either in the village or poor sectors of the urban population, is a constraint on their ability to take advantage of them. The poor live from hand to mouth, and borrow from or participate in a credit association in order to meet food costs and maintain a minimum level of living, while still maintaining some degree of self-respect by attempting to hold the appropriate ceremonies when necessary and to ensure that their families are happy (Caldwell 1982:166).

When the State, then, is unable (or unwilling) to provide income or adequate security, and where financial institutions of a western style suffer bad repute, and the provision of returns on investments is incommensurate with the investment, children remain one of the few available options of investment, and in a form that may be termed "enforced savings"; that is, the benefits from children are received without any appreciated outlay, and thereby investment has no felt cost. It is hence easier to achieve compared with the more difficult voluntary savings represented by former examples (Caldwell, 1972: 227).

Having limited investment opportunities, poor people can enhance their initial surviving investments (children) by means of educating their children. This increases the possible return from the child who has broken through to a job in the modern economy. He/she can assist the parents state of health or feebleness (Caldwell 1982:54). Clearly the value of and the returns from children cannot be worked out neither for the present nor the future alone.

But it is a fallacy to think of the value of children as merely an insurance policy against old age and sickness; even in terms of financial help, most parents receive continuing assistance from adult or married children irrespective of the parents' state of health or feebleness *(ibid.)*. Clearly the value of and the returns from children cannot be worked out neither for the present nor the future alone.

Any such, analysis as Mueller's of the value of children in the village or Third World peasant subsistence economy often fails to understand the subsistence nature of childhood services: unlike industrial societies, the consumption of goods is subsistence in nature such that wants are more frequently satisfied by services than goods *(ibid.*, p. 37).

Children as Wealth

Since peasant economic behavior is largely an aspect of kinship behavior, it is therefore organized by means completely different from capitalist production and market transaction (Sahlins, cited in Caldwell 1982:14; see also Caldwell 1982:73; and Pertierra 1979:76). Certainly there is a division of labor; but children do many tasks not as inferior supplements to adult labor, as Mueller and others imply, but as a form of specialization and work that adults would find painful to do (Caldwell, 1982:37). Even though children may have a market productivity factor of less than one, as Mueller and others claim, the fact remains that without children doing some kinds of work, the market productivity of adults would be less than their current productivity and perhaps less than one, and thereby below a subsistence level.

The identification of children with wealth, their advantages and disadvantages, have been thought of largely in economic terms or as guarantees of security. But it is only a small minority of parents who think of an increase in family size as imposing a greater economic hardship. Many couples still continue to raise children, and therefore by inference, do not perceive themselves to be economically disadvantaged by high fertility. They may well perceive themselves to be suffering hardship, but peasants do not always or necessarily blame this on their children; and we must be careful to discriminate, and account for any discrepancy, between what peasants say and do. It is interesting that the belief that children of large families are less well-off is held by the better-off families of the city and by the outside observer, who may feel that the rural or urban poor are wretched. But it is significant that the peasantry rarely regard themselves or their children as being wretchedly poor (Caldwell 1982:65; see also Hull 1975, *passim.)*

Given these facts, that fertility remains high and that parents do not think of children just as a competitive form of expenditure drawing on money which would otherwise be available for alternative expenditure or investment, Caldwell (1982) has developed an elaborate theory to explain high fertility in terms of the positive value of children with reference to social factors as well as to direct and indirect economic benefits.

Using the term "wealth flow" to define all the money, goods and guarantees that one person provides to another, emphasizing that the transactions are not all monetary, or at any given time are not all material *(ibid.,* p. 333), Caldwell points out that children learn to help in the house or on the farm at a comparatively early age, from about five years onward. Their tasks are usually commensurate with their ability and size (and often their sex). Their services are in many cases indispensable, for by carrying out the more monotonous time-consuming tasks, children give their parents/guardians leisure to pursue their specialist activities, to attend market, or to just do more arduous chores *(ibid.,* p. 51).

These services, returns and securities are gained or enhanced by establishing or increasing a network of social relationships – perhaps at times "buying" obligations. The most important network is that of kin, which in size is largely dependent on the extent to which one's fertility (and one's relatives') overcomes the ravages of mortality, and the extension of the network of relatives made possible by marriage *(ibid.,* p. 35).

The ability to achieve better positions in a social or power structure is often perceived to be positively related to the strength or extent of one's extended family. For example, a son who does well in school and secures a good position in government or commerce brings prestige to the family, and additionally may be instrumental in securing a good position for younger siblings or for cousins. Here, in a generalized sense, the value of children arises in regard to the value of the family as a unit over and above the value of the individual family member (Hull 1975: 375-6).

The experience of coping with periodic disasters also shows how important family links can be (Caldwell 1982:5). It is little wonder, then, that high fertility and early marriage are (or were) highly esteemed *(ibid.,* p. 35).

The value of children in such a network refers to the functions they serve to parents or the needs they fulfill. The specific values are anchored in particular psychological needs, and are also tied to the social structure. They are thus subject to cultural variation and social change (Hull 1975: 19).

In attempting to work out the value of children, we can systematically list their functions and hence advantages, and their disadvantages, referring (respectively) to the gross value and costs of children and thereby their net value or disvalue (see Hoffman 1972: 27; Arnold and others 1975; 9-10, 46-8). Bulatao (1979: 17), for example, sets out such advantages and disadvantages, as follows:

Advantages

1. Instrumental assistance.
2. Rewarding interactions.
3. Psychological appreciations.
4. Others.

Disadvantages

1. Financial costs.
2. Childrearing demands.
3. Restrictions on parents.
4. Costs to social relationships.
5. Others.

Hoffman and Hoffman (1973) also propose a model containing five broad sets of variables in relation to the satisfaction and costs of children: 1) the value of children (VOC), 2) alternative sources of the value, 3) costs, 4) barriers, and 5) facilitators. Of the first set of these variables (i.e., VOC), nine categories are presented, each reflecting particular psychological needs or functions served by having children. However, it is the ninth category, economic utility, which has received most attention by social scientists, and upon which we shall also focus in this paper, with some acknowledgement of the other categories, particularly that of "achievement-competence-creativity" and "power-influence-effectance," which have an obvious bearing on economic utility.

More specifically, some of the activities undertaken by children are listed by Nag et al. (1978:294); child care, food preparation, firewood collection, household maintenance, animal care, agricultural and non-agricultural wage labor, handicrafts, reciprocal labor exchange, rice and garden cultivation, trading, and others (see also White 1975).

Numerous examples – watching over livestock, running errands, fetching water, minding siblings and the like – serve to emphasize the value of children's activities, which although may be time-consuming or of low productivity, *are nevertheless productive:* the employment of otherwise less or non-productive (young) children minimally frees parents and older siblings to engage in directly or more productive work. (See for example: Nag et al. 1977, and 1978: 295-7; Ware, 1978: 11-6; Caldwell, 1982: 52).

These examples also serve to highlight that productive activities for children do exist and are not limited; in fact, there is a multiplicity of – and necessity of many – occupations available in peasant societies (see for example, Pertierra 1979 and Kerkvliet 1980). Of course many of these activities may be underproductive per unit of labor time; but it is in fact this very problem of underproductivity that makes it essential for children and adults to spend long hours in a variety of employment activities (Nag and others 1978: 299-300).[2]

Having such a diversity of occupations or activities, each household can obtain income from many sources in direct proportion to the amount of labor that the household can provide. It seems possible, then, that however limited the opportunities for productive labor, each individual household, by increasing its size (through recruitment[3], or more commonly through reproduction) obtains not less but more of a share of these opportunities, even though the aggregate of such behavior may be an overall decline in job availability in the economy as a whole. However, while opportunities exist, children are able to undertake productive work to make themselves economically valuable to their parents or at least self-supporting. From this it may be suggested that:

> In peasant villages of high population density, households with a relatively large number of children appear to ensure themselves a lengthy period of economic 'success' during the latter phase of their development. The duration of this period depends both on the parents' ability to produce children who *survive*. . . and on *their ability to retain control of their children's labour* by postponing their dispersal from the household" (Nag and others: 300, the later emphasis is mine).

But within a short historical time, dramatic changes have altered the pattern of parental control in peasant societies. Consumer goods, schooling, nationalistic values, intrusive commercial economics, and communications, have brought changes. Traditional ways of arranging marriages have been overturned, and parents are losing control of children's time and the fruits of their labor. Children work less and spend more time in school. They set high standards of consumption, often in conflict with the economic welfare of the household. These changes transform not only the activity patterns, but the entire structure of factors which determine the economic value and autonomy of children (Hull, in Nag and others 1978: 302).

It is in fact this change that Caldwell (1982) confronts in accounting for a fertility decline in underdeveloped countries; a decline and changing pattern of behavior which he posits in the effect of education.

The Effect of Education

Caldwell's (1982) basic premise is that fertility declines because of a rise in the cost of children. This is a result of change in the mode of production, from familial to capitalist (i.e., modernization[4]), the importation of western ideas (i.e., westernization) and education. Simply stated, the economic changes in the mode of production create goods which compete with the products and services of the domestic mode of production and necessitates at least a minimally educated workforce (see Caldwell 1982: 176, for example).

However, Caldwell (1982: 116) emphasizes the social rather than the purely economic aspect with respect to fertility; and that forces sustaining unrestricted fertility are often strengthened by economic modernization unaccmpanied by specific types of social change: this is the explanation for sustained high fertility in a modernizing (and urbanizing) situation, undergoing a change in the mode of production. With the introduction of mass education, the direction of the wealth flow between generations is changed,

> at least partly because the relationships between members of the family are transformed as the morality governing those relationships changes. . . Family production works within a framework of family morality, which enjoins children to work hard, demand little, and respect. . . authority. . . Children are employed from an early age and are valued as an addition to the work force. The flow of wealth is upward from children to parents. . . and high fertility is profitable. . . to the parents (Caldwell 1982: 301-1).

The social structure, in turn, supports economic realities in that large families are regarded as honorable and a fulfillment of parents' duty (Caldwell 1982: 302).

> This morality (and the concomitant high fertility) can long survive the growth of a substantial capitalist labour market, partly because it is supported by public religion and private adage, and partly because the parental generation continues to benefit from it, especially when most domestic production of goods and services is subsistence production by wives and children.

What the family morality cannot survive is a new, non-family production morality, which is taught by national education systems. Given westernization and industrialization, the competition from the capitalist sector is in its provision of goods/services which can be more easily and cheaply produced and obtained in increasing quantities than similar or even non-existing goods/services available under a familial mode of production. And given the momentum of capitalist production, there is not only an increase in the need for labor,

thereby taking children from their families and also whole families from the land, but there is a need for this labor to be reasonably educated. This need, supported by the western ideology of the virtue of education, democracy, and egalitarianism at decision-making, emphasizes the value of education and worth of educating one's children.

Caldwell (1982:303-5) argues that the greatest impact of education is not direct, but through the restructuring of family relationships and, hence, family economies and the direction of the net wealth flow. He postulates that the need to educate children increases the cost of child rearing and has an impact on fertility through a number of mechanisms.

1. Schooling creates dependency, both within the family and within the society.
2. The school serves as a major instrument for propagating the values of the western middle-class.
3. Schooling speeds up cultural change and creates new cultures; the education agenda is that of the broad society and its capitalist economy, and not that of family production and morality.
4. Education increases the cost of children beyond school fees and material necessities (e.g. books, uniforms, equipment, etc.). School children demand more of their family in a way unprecedented. The real cost of schooling to parents is that it upsets the whole parent-child relationship and balance of expenditure. Certainly education may have direct monetary costs; but measured only in terms of a cash balance, where there may appear to be a pattern in which children are a drain on the family budget as long as they stay at school, is perhaps somewhat unrealistic.
5. Education reduces the child's potential for work inside and outside the home. The time factor limits the availability of children to assist in family chores and contribute to the household economy. Additionally, with education's inherent western ideologies, children are more reluctant until they complete their education to contribute directly to the household, particularly in a familial mode of production; but rather, they have aspirations fuelled by capitalist occupations and consumption.

One could well argue that where education has become widespread, almost universal, and "compulsory," as it has done so in the Philippines, then it may be perceived as a burden by parents; for although schooling may not make household or other employment impossible, it may induce schoolchildren to resent working considerable hours in unpleasant occupations or in addition to school work, and parents may be reluctant to force them to do so. Conveying the message that schooling means access to western riches and lifestyle, education emphasizes independence.

Hence it may appear that one of the major costs of education and thus child-rearing and high fertility in a transitional period is the opportunity costs of the child's time that has to be spent in school work rather than direct productive employment, making education appear to be a perfect example of a luxury for the exclusive use of children. But this ignores the value of education as an investment, and one of the best investments available to parents, because other investments are extremely insecure. This investment value, of course, is true as long as the parents can be confident that their children will fulfill their obligations to repay their debt in later life (Ware 1978: 12).

In these ways the costs of children may not only increase, but their immediate value to the household declines, indicating that children may no longer really share the responsibility for the family's survival in the present. Caldwell, therefore, claims that education is a key component in the change to fertility decline. Concurrently, with westernization and the increasing mode of capitalist production, i.e., industrialisation, there is a reversal of the wealth flow, previously from children to parents, to one of parents to children,until the children at least complete their education and are able to assist through their occupation with money or power to the support of parents and family.[5]

However, in many parts of the developing world, in particular the Philippines, pressure on land, government redistribution schemes, and technological innovations for land cultivation, displace many rural families or persons, creating a rural-urban in-migration in such massive num-

bers as not to be absorbed in an increasingly technical and educated, but limited, capitalist environment. The consequences of this are well known: massive urbanization of a very low standard, with many people in lowpaid, unskilled or part-time work, or unemployed, and consequently poor, living in slums or squatter areas.

Wage earning is most frequently then regarded not as an alternative economy to the familial one, nor as a path to liberation from family authority, nor even as a means of accumulating individual property, but as a method for supplementing total family income or wealth. Indeed, Meillassoux (1972: 102) argues that capitalism has frequenlty contributed to this end, paying wages too small for the worker to set up a nuclear family and only enough for him/her to supplement the income of an extended family (Caldwell 1982: 163).

Simultaneously, government edicts, backed by western ideology, maintain the need for children to be educated. In this situation, children of the urban masses may not be able to contribute to family income by means of input through a familial mode of production; yet they must assist in the subsistence of the family where and whenever they can in conjunction with their education within the capitalist mode of production. Since their cost has risen and their value of input has in traditional terms been devalued, children must in some way compensate by increasing the value of their input to the family. Because this class of poor people are in a state of transition between the modern and traditional systems and the latter's associated values, children must still maintain, to some degree, in balance, a wealth flow from themselves to their parents at a proportionally high value to offset their increased costs. For unlike in developed western countries, where children contribute economically very little to families' subsistence until the completion of their education, in the Philippines children are often still required to assist with the subsistence of their family, or to themselves and thereby their own education. One way this can be done is by working within a framework of a capitalist mode of production.[6]

Two Socioeconomic Systems

This, then, is occurring in a society in transition from the familial to the capitalist mode of production. The urban poor family, displaced from the land, unskilled, incompletely educated or westernized, unable to produce goods or provide traditional services for market, sale, or its own use, must find ways and means of providing services for the capitalist mode of production.

But in order to understand this particular adaptation to this condition, it is necessary to view the contemporary industrialising Philippines as a place where people live not in one system – the traditional, familial productive mode – nor another system – the developed, modern, western, industrial, capitalist productive mode – but rather, they live in both socioeconomic systems simultaneously or in alternation.

Whereas it is often thought that rural populations are stereotypically traditional, and urban populations modern, while transitional populations are thought to be marginal, subject to strains, anomie and the like (see Feldman and Hurn 1966: 381), in reality the case is often that individuals and families live in both the old and the new systems, getting what they can from each. There is usually not even conflict in the values: the system of values from one world is used to maximize returns from the other (see Gusfield 1967: 354-50). For example, the patriarch emphasises the duty of the older generation, and the son who has a job in town gives not only deference but also a sizeable amount of his earnings; the son's job is threatened or he faces an unwanted transfer, and the patriarch talks to a neighbor so that the latter's son who has a key post in the employing organization takes action to remove the threat (Caldwell 1982: 293-5).

Paradoxically, it is the capitalist mode of production, in making available wage labor particularly in the cities, which enables the youth-child to break away from his/her family and be independent or self-supporting. And yet, at the same time, because of the fluctuations in the labor market and the possibility of unem-

ployment, the young wage worker is faced with a lack of security or lack of alternatives other than his/her family. This prevents the youth from breaking entirely with his/her family of origin.

Indeed, it is this link to the family which not only gives the youth security, but also gives a certain freedom in the capitalist market to leave employment at will or to treat it casually; this link may also be used to enhance employment prospects or merely maintain employment. But this familial link to security is not free: the youth must give, and indeed is expected to give, in return.

Of course, such a reciprocal relationship will be sustained, and the parents will *profit* from having children, only if control of the products of children's labor (for some years after the children become capable of supporting themselves) is possible, and only if there is some underlying cultural principle of reciprocity or obligation as a sustaining force. That some children of any one family may refuse to accept this cultural principle – their obligations to their parents – focuses the need to have, and the value of, many children where parents are not confident of being able to maintain access to the material resources accumulated by fewer children (see Ware 1978: 4-5). Under these social conditions a large family represents a rational economic goal for parents.

Whereas for hunter-gatherers large numbers of children were a mixed blessing unless food supply was abundant, the increase of the food supply amongst human groups by their own agricultural-pastoral efforts allowed for more children, which in turn made the family wealthier. This has been the argument so far, and remains true until natural resources, especially land, have been exploited to the limit of available technology, capital or social structure. As pressures on resources grow, economic calculations are influenced as much by the nature of the social structure as by scarcity. Elements of the former affecting parental cost-benefit calculations include children's functions as servants to their parents, the system of land tenure and inheritance, the boundary of the extended family as an economic unit, the socially sanctioned level of expenditure on children, the opportunity costs of child-rearing (especially for women), and the economic activities of children themselves (Ware 1978: 1).

The level of expenditure and the opportunity costs have been dealt with and more fully elaborated by Caldwell (1982), for example, who has proposed that in a transitional society, such as the Philippines, these two factors have become salient, contributing to a cost increase of children. Given the breakdown of the system of land tenure and inheritance owing to the increased capitalization of agriculture and land reform, and subsequent rural-urban in-migration, together with a changed (or changing) wealth flow to one of parents to children; and given the increased opportunity costs owing (as Caldwell proposes) to the rise of education and change in the mode of production, it can be hypothesized that the functions of children as servants to their parents have changed, such that these services are not less value unless the child him/her self can, in an inflationary way, contribute relatively the same as or more than previously. The boundaries of the extended family as an economic unit, too, have changed, in that the family is more nucleated, but still retains (or has increased) its importance in regard to reciprocal obligations. And the economic activities of children themselves have changed from being marginal, seemingly frivolous, labor intensive and time consuming, to one of adapting to or manipulating a capitalist mode of production for high (or higher) rewards, and thereby central – or at least less peripheral – to the more nucleated household budget.

Given the changed conditions in the rural sector and subsequent growth of population in the urban sector, and that such urbanization generally has not destroyed the social structure, particularly that of the family, there still remains an assurance that parents can profit from their children (Ware 1978: 24). As long as floor wages or a variety of income-producing activities exist, and as long as the society encourages children to pick up work when it is available, children can contribute substantially to their own support and that of their own family

(Caldwell, 1982: 52). A large family cannot only cope with its own tasks but it often has excess labor which can be used to make windfall gains when sudden demands for labor are made or to meet more constant demands. It can be seen, then, that we are dealing with two related issues: 1) the value of children as contributing to their own and their family's subsistence, and 2) a large number of children per family.

Having asserted that a large number of children in a family is economically viable in the rural sector, it may now be proposed that children are even more viable, and in fact more necessary, amongst the squalid urban population. For a reliance solely on cash income necessitates multiple sources of income in terms of both people (to take up opportunities as they arise) and activities or occupatons. Hence, as Caldwell (1982: 6) argues, the cultural superstructure lags behind changes in the means of production, and thus parents of large families experience no economic disadvantage long after familial production has been substantially transformed.[7]

Such an argument of course bears on the question: what sort of fortune – food, wealth, or means of productivity – can children be expected to bring into the world (at birth) under the current conditions of urbanized industrialised poverty? Whereas formerly they were expected to provide the means of their own livelihood by means of the value of their child labor, are they now perhaps born as a material burden which can never be repaid (Hull 1975: 1)?

Social Change

One of the major factors in regard to the work of children is the rapid progress of social change. In view of the rate at which schools have sprung up, the impact of radios, newspapers, and other forms of mass media on social norms, and the increase of demographic pressures. It is obvious that the nature and extent of the participation of children in various activities must have changed also. This is perhaps all the more dramatic in the Philippines because of the influence of the presence of foreigners in the form of corporate bodies, military personnel and tourists, and the rapid change from rice cultivation of a subsistence nature and the former system of land tenure, to a society of growing industrialization. These factors have meant that some children in the Philippines now have jobs such as helper on a truck, a waiter or waitress in a cafe, a house servant, or parking attendant, and the like. Many of these jobs are, of course, taken by the older children who may already be independent of their parents; but the vast majority of children remain as the pool of labor available for housework, agricultural or industrial labor, or for minor jobs such as selling ice, cigarettes or papers, collecting re-usable items, or caring for animals, and so on (Hull 1975:311). Thus in the urban areas, as in the former rural areas, it may be seen that the material benefits that might reasonably be expected to arise from the work of a child in a poor household are very close to the material costs entailed in their birth and upkeep. To the extent that a poor family might expect a child to begin work earlier or remain longer in the family would only serve to increase the value of the child's labor and his/her contribution of surplus to the household; while the fact that girls can often participate in trading or other productive labor means that the value of *their* labor relative to boys' is not much diminished (*ibid:* 311).

In this transitional situation of urbanization and squalor, parents attempt to maintain the emotional and wealth flows from young to old, ensuring that children work hard and consume relatively little. Any relaxation in the veneration for the old or the male household head would fundamentally change the production-consumption system: greater care lavished on children would upset the priorities assigned to different individuals within the family structure, alter the time allocation of labor, change the balance of consumption, and render the young less likely to accept the direction of their labor or to work as hard. But a society based on the labor market does not need this upward

flow in either veneration or wealth; it is a change accelerated by the imposition of mass education, which alters not only the students' world view but also economic and other relationships within the family (Caldwell 1982: 230-1, 237).

Related to this phenomenon is the growing restlessness of young people. They learn a different way of life, adopt modern styles of clothing, and perhaps become noisier; the stage known as adolescence becomes more apparent. There is implied and actual challenge to familial authority. In the rural areas, sons may be restless, working for their fathers on the family farm or in the family business, partly for the social reason that they resent the paternal authority and partly for the economic reason that they could earn more money elsewhere. Amongst young or unmarried women the trend may be to take on more independent attitudes and activities. In such a society new balances within the family are occurring, increasingly militating against the establishment or maintenance of multi-generational households, with implications for both emotional and productive relations. These new and strained relationships sometimes lead to bitterness and separation, as allegiance to parents may not be sufficient to hold the household together (Caldwell 1982: 224-5).

But children and kin in urban areas are still needed to bring earnings into the household in circumstances where the total income of a poor household is often the sum of many small parts. For although there may be changes in the economy – i.e., changes in the mode of production, and changes in the culture and values – and challenges to the hierarchical structure of the family, the present system of parent-child financial relationships still depends for its working on the concept of extended family, communal help, and reciprocity. It is in fact the changes that have occurred (and are occurring), with their inherent uncertainty for security and stability, that limits the attempts by kin or children to break away from all obligations (Caldwell 1982: 146).

Changes in the economy and society following the massive intrusion of the west and its educational system have lessened the need for the extended family system by weakening communal tenure of land and common residence; and many forms of insecurity have been reduced by a host of changes – from modern health measures to a smaller chance of being destroyed by local disasters. But these changes have not led to the extended or "composite"[8] family being an inefficient unit and profiting from economic opportunities. In fact, despite its further nucleation, the family has proven surprisingly efficient in selecting and financing children to climb the educational ladder to high salaries, and in exporting prosperity from the towns back to the rural areas (Caldwell 1982: 110).

Rephrasing the Arguement

There are a number of criticisms that may be levelled at such a line of thought. However, it needs to be pointed out at this juncture that I am not arguing here that children are the sole or main supporters of a household (although this is not beyond possibility), but they at least minimize their own cost to their parents, contribute something significant to the household budget, and/or pay for their own education – thus reducing or removing most or all of the burden of their existence from their parents. If a child can so "pay his/her own way", and this can occur from about age 5-6 years, then the positive factor of the possibility of contributing to the household or family advancement, enhances the view that children are, if not wholly free of cost, no disadvantage to parents. This is the main point in studying the value of children in this paper, and not who contributes most to the family budget. The need for a high(er) monetary input to the family budget is shown by the large number of married women employed. Although this is not a new phenomenon (Vancio 1980: 10-11), perhaps more than ever before, married women are entering the formal or informal work sphere, indicating an inability (or unwillingness?) to rely solely on the income of husband/father. Given that women generally earn less than men indicates that any minimal increment in family income is significant. Thus the income contributed by children – and this is usually not just from one

child, but three, four or more – would also be valuable. Additionally, one must always remember that in many families, the male breadwinner may often be absent, sick, unemployed, or only intermittently employed; similarly for the wife/mother. In such conditions any contribution is significant, and any child holds hope.

Nor can the fact that children are valuable in an urban setting be countered by claims of lower overall birth rates (in the last 20 years) for urban areas. Certainly rates may be lower, and lowest in Metro Manila, but a "class" analysis will show that urban and rural rates for the lower classes are very similar. Any general trend or overall effect may well arise from a reduced rate amongst the upper and growing middle classes, who usually congregate in cities or large provincial towns.

In any case, that the birth or fertility rate is declining in the Philippines does not prove children are a disvalue; rather, apart from differential rates according to socioeconomic status, a declining birth rate shows the effect of such factors as education, marrying age, contraceptive use, and the like – but only in a society that is increasingly becoming modern, western and industrialised.

Along with westernization is a later age of marrying. Not only do urban and western influences promote an enjoyment of single life whilst young, but also education adds to the deferment of marriage and thus reduced fertility.

Acting against such influences are, of course, other factors: the weakening of traditional norms of chastity (cf., Vancio 1980: 6-7) and orientation toward one's family of origin. Additionally, it may be contested that rural-urban migrants are fairly well-educated, dynamic, upwardly mobile, and thereby ready "acceptors" of family planning. But the fact is that educational standards are lower in rural areas, as is family planning acceptance. Thus rural-urban migrants are hardly dynamically upwardly mobile and ready "acceptors"; rather, they are often desperately poor, and retain many folk beliefs and superstitions. While perhaps reducing fertility rates or population pressure in the rural sector merely by their out-migration from that sector, they could, if they retain traditional beliefs and behavior, add to the urban rate of fertility.

A decreasing resort to breastfeeding, too, would also contribute to higher fertility, but indications are that, overall, women of the Philippines are marrying later than previously, and urban women later than rural counterparts, and thus effecting a fertility decline (see Yu and Liu 1980; Concepcion and Smith 1977: 20-30). How much of this stems from what factor remains problematic. Even so, a Philippine national average of 5-6 children per family (Concepcion and Smith 1977: 30) can hardly be called "small" for a country that seeks to modernize and westernize itself, reduce population growth, and has an extensive family planning program.

But my argument is that, while the process of transition is occurring, and particularly for the lower social classes, children remain a net vaue – which is not to deny a turning point when children do become a net disvalue and induce a fertility decline. In fact, in the Philippines, for the middle class, that point seems to have been reached. But there remains a *prima facie* case, at least, that, for the poorer urban and rural classes, fertility rates have not declined and thus children must retain an overall net value – or are we to believe in a demographic or cultural "false consciousness"?

Conclusion

The outline, then, of how and why high fertility and the concomitant value of children operates in such a society in transition – from peasant agriculture to a more urbanized society, and in this particular case of the Philippines, amongst the squalid poor of the metropolis, with most people working in commerce, administration, small factories, or in subsistence commercial occupations such as street vending – posits the essential factor in the retention of the traditional system of assistance and of the direction in which that assistance still flows, from child to parent; a system of assistance which developed in the rural lands (Caldwell 1982: 102) of

the Philippines, extending to and incorporating landlords and benefactors in a dyadic patron-client relationship.

Communal economic interests and residential proximity have, in a society which has experienced multitudes of disasters – epidemics, invasions, floods, drought, and crop disease – produced an intricate system of obligations and assistance which go far beyond the nuclear family. Given that only the protection against such scourges and the only guarantee of personal survival in such a subsistence culture – under industrialization transposed from the rural poor to the urban squalors – is in the numbers and assurances of mutual help, there has grown an underlying great respect for the system of mutual obligations and a belief in increasing the number of persons contained by such a system. Such a network can be increased naturally by having children who in time marry into other families, linking two kin groups together and allowing these new relatives-by-marriage to seek or be sought for assistance to an extent that non-relatives could not (Caldwell 1982:92-3). This kinship group, in going beyond affines, may incorporate ritual (fictive) kin, as is common in the Philippines in the form of godparents *(compadrazgo)*.

In a strange and perhaps tautological way, this structuring of kin – affines, cognates and fictive kin – shows that children must be of some value: if children were not valuable there would be little point in linking kin groups – if even in a reciprocal relation – by a marriage; in fact, there would be little point in marriage apart from its facilitation of the biological reproductive function – if even this! By showing that children create reciprocal obligatory bonds of assistance and alliance between kin groups by means of marriage and involvement in patron-client type relationships, it is shown that children are – *if only for economic reasons* – valuable.

In such relationships, however, parents, families or kin do not always or necessarily enhance their material wealth. By focusing on material benefits and listing correlate variables, as Bulatao (1979: 17) and Hoffman and Hoffman (1973) do, within a capitalist conceptual framework, we may tend to overlook the remaining fact that, whether these variables have negative or positive effects on fertility, at various life stages or in some manner of interaction, these variables are the ones identified by both theorists and parents, and have the *sum* effect of allowing for or causing large numbers of children in many families. This fact is given; and given that fact, it necessarily follows that children must be of some worth (i.e., value) to parents. That children, or a large number of them, are a cost (i.e., disvalue) in no way excludes the direct economic value of them, as I have indicated throughout this paper.

But to speak in terms of "value" and "disvalue" is to imply a "profit and loss" motif; it refers to a capital outlay, when in fact no such outlay is incurred, or no capitalisation or profit is expected (although it may be hoped for).

Studies of the value of children have ignored the subsistence nature of rural or urban life and/or families,[9] the subsistence value of children, and the value of kin networks formed or extended by children through marriage or patron-client relationships in a subsistence economy.

Children may well have a net disvalue; but the effect of their presence, of high fertility, is not to cause starvation – for the family, living at a subsistence level is not necessarily literally starving – nor to create poverty – for the family is already poor.

The effect of children may be to reduce the level at which subsistence occurs, only now for a larger number of people (although this subsistence reduction is problematic, for an "economy of scale" may be effective, as Kleinman [1966] suggests). Had such a new lower level been imposed by, say, a landlord increasing his/her share of paddy or raising the rent, it may have been experienced as intolerable and exploitative (see Scott 1976). But because this new level was "voluntary", anticipated or planned, and a gradual occurrence, parents and existing children adapt to it.

This disvalue of children, if being the case, begs the question as to why parents persist in having large families? I have already listed

various factors that people say make children valuable. Taken together they amount to an articulation of the desire or possibility in the "lottery of life" of raising rather than decreasing one's level of subsistence through children – long- or short-term. That these articulations may be cultural rationalizations for what is unknown (by anthropologists and parents?) is a possibility – but which takes us no nearer to the given fact that high fertility persists.

Given the fact that high fertility persists, then, it may be viewed as a means of ensuring physical and/or cultural survival. Where the possibility of children raising a family's subsistence level exists, at no cost to the (village) community – and this is the real meaning of subsistence: the person or family as a subsystem of the community existing at an adequate level, which poses no threat to the community – high fertility, culturally rationalized and institutionalized by means of those idioms we call "value of children variables," will be viable where no alternatives exist.

One last point: by dealing with the value of children at a subsistence level we dispense with a capitalist or western view of every productive resource – in this case families and children – having to create a surplus. For the first five years of a child's life, there may well be an expense for the parents, which may never be recouped, and certainly as an investment may never show a profit (surplus). But after five years a child attains its own level of subsistence, and means of maintaining it. That the parents do not profit materially from the child is irrelevant, so long as they do not lose, and except insofar that the possibility of their plan did not come to fruition. But without children even the possibility – the opportunity values of children – does not exist. To assert that children are "unwanted" is to impose a western ethnocentric view; and ignores that children are wanted for various sentimental reasons, and because they are needed.

Notes

[1]A subsistence economy may be defined in terms as that described by Scott (1976) whereby the individual or family lives at a basic or minimal level, with little hope (or aspiration) of making a clear profit over and above daily needs of existence by means of labor or investment. In short, it is a basic standard of living, self perpetuating, with no advancement to a higher level (See also Scott 1975: 507). In this context children are not only self sustaining for themselves, but also may contribute to the self-sustenance of the household as a corporate unit. In these respects, there are obvious differences between the three main – lower, middle and upper – classes.

[2]These activities pertain to opportunity values and costs of children or parents, especially mothers. The assertion that women, kept from productive work by child-bearing and raising, should limit the size of their families is invalidated by such factors as:

(a) Women work close to home or in "cottage" industries, compatible with childrearing, e.g., sari-sari stores in the Philippines (see Silverio 1982);

(b) Where there may be conflicts, as with trading or factory or white-collar work, the extended family can provide child-minders;

(c) Where domestic tasks are time-consuming, daughters are able to share or shoulder the burden; and

(d) For the urban professional woman, cheap nurse-maids are available or affordable (Ware 1978: 13).

From these few examples it can be seen that occupational (and geographical) mobility and economic success are not necessarily incompatible with high fertility. Even the very few women fortunate to be offered job choice and advancement do not feel pressured by large families, partly because employers are stil attuned to the high fertility culture, and because extended families or home villages can supply young girls, with little education, as inexpensive childminders (Caldwell 1982: 33).

However, the introduction of universal education may alter this situation, as educated girls expect adequate pay and often do not wish to be nurse-maids (Ware 1978: 13).

[3]Although parents rely to a great extent on their own offspring rather than siblings, siblings' children, and the like for their immediate day-to-day support, and that it is not uncommon for a grandchild to be 'parked' with grandparents to be cared for by, or more often to care for them, it is not unusual for grandparents, other relaives, or neighbors, whose children have moved away, or for a couple with few or no living children, or who are old or sterile, to adopt one or more children of a sibling or other close relatives, precisely to ensure immediate assistance and/or future support (Nag and others 1978: 299). Obviously, if individuals are prepared to rear other people's children, they exhibit either extreme altruism or the per-

ception that they will gain thereby (Ware, 1978: 19). As Caldwell (1982: 357) says:

> if a family is small, or if there are difficulties caused by absences, sex imbalances among births, or life-cycle stage, substitutions can be made. In such families... a boy may be seen drawing water instead of a girl, while... a man may take a message instead of a boy. Such substitutions are usually felt to be very humiliating and avoided either by adopting children or taking in suitable relatives for long periods.

From the other side, a family with "too many" children may feel over-burdened by the expenses involved in raising them, and may "loan" one of them out to a neighbor or relative to raise. This is not to say that large families or that children are economic burdens; the argument is that fertility – children – are economically rational only between certain limits that are set by non-economic factors (1982: 127). The term "transaction" could perhaps best describe the nature of the above relationships (Hull 1975: 43).

Further evidence of the value of children is the practice of "child-pawning"

> ... in which parents borrow money, handing over their child as security, and the child's labor represents the interest on the loan, even though the lender has to feed, clothe, and shelter the child (Ware 1978: 20).

So here we have not only the economic or functional values of children, but also the social variables of status and role to consider.

This also indicates the relative importance of any one child. Although children are important, the economic value of a child is often only marginal for family subsistence-consumption. However, a child's productivity is significant, and it is for this reason that a child may be "parked" with kin as a paid servant, where his/her productivity may be greater than if he/she stayed at home. If the child is not paid for this service-work parents still gain (at least marginally) by not having the expenditure of the child's consumption and/or education. In both cases the parents gain even more if they are able to maintain access to the child's current or future resources. In short, it is only because children are productive and valuable, and not that they are unwanted, that parents are able and willing to "lend" their children.

[4]Caldwell (1982: 289) distinguishes between "modernization and "westernization;" as follows:

> Modernization is that degree of social change which inevitably accompanies economic change because the new economic order demands it – anything less would be grossly inefficient and even chaotic. The factory hand... must obey his boss and not seek guidance from his father, and he must obey... rules about not stealing the equipment even if the possession of such equipment would please his father and benefit the whole family... Westernization is the social change over and above this which results from importing aspects of the Western way of life... (which) may fit in better with the new economic system...

The interplay of these two concepts in the Philippines is important for the understanding of the value of children, the role of the family and kin, and why patron-client or dyadic relationships can still have significance in a transitional society.

[5]It is worth briefly considering, at this point, from the native's perspective, what makes (educated) children such secure investments? I have previously asserted that many children are needed because parents are not confident of gaining a return on all their children, because of children's deaths, academic incompetence, or by the parents losing access to the resources of their children. Given these risks one must account for their preference over other forms of investment. In short, if other investments are risky, *and children are risky*, then why choose the latter? Is it a matter of assessing the least risk, or do children have some positive characteristic/s?

The answer in part may be found by reference to an underlying cultural obligation – reciprocity or *utang na loob* (debt of gratitude) in the Philippines (see Kaut 1961, for example), which limits an overt parental controlling "watchfulness". Rather than having parents directly controlling their children's activities and resources, (although parents certainly do this), *utang na loob*, or a norm of reciprocity, acts as a controlling mechanism. As a social principle it is an instrument of the family.

But despite this obligation many children fail to assist their parents, siblings or other kin, (see Traeger 1981, for example). For this reason, and for reasons of mortality, academic incompetence, or loss of parental control over a child's resources, it would be too risky for parents to reduce the number of children born and expect a higher return from their one or few offspring. By reducing this risk, one is more assured that one successful elite salary from many possible children will outweight the earnings of a string of siblings working in poor urban or rural occupations and will compensate for the expenditure on several failed educations (Caldwell 1982: 104).

Additionally, the successful child may be able to subsequently help his/her siblings, who in their turn can contribute to the parents' income. Given an "economy of scale" in raising children, by educating two, three or more to a successful level, one has multiplied one's chances in the so-called "lottery of life" (Kleinman 1966).

It is because children do represent a risky investment that parents have many; and such an "investment mentality" would also account for child-bearing behavior that is viewed as a sequence of decisions; parents not only want to have "children", but want to have a second, third, fourth...

However, such views as the that of sequential decision-making, and the economic deterministic "investment mentality" imply that natives of underdeveloped cultures make conscious decisions about, first, having or not having children, and second, the number of children. The fact is, both children and their number are, amongst the rural and urban poor, rarely planned. Certainly women articulate to interviewers their child-bearing plans, but the empirical reality discords with the normative or ideal. Factors such as absence or ignorance of family planning methods, religious and/or social taboos against family planning, cost of contraceptives, the male's insistence on his conjugal rights, and the proof of his masculinity through children, and so on all go to construct the social (i.e., non-economic and non-conscious) pressures to bear (many) children (see Yu and Liu 1980, for example).

[6]One such form of work would be prostitution, particularly child or adolescent prostitution. It is an activity which is hardly congenial to a mode of familial production, but fits neatly into a capitalist mode, whereby the prostitute's "labor" is "unskilled", and yet can provide a service for those who require it, perhaps as a form of diversion from their (the clients') capitalist work involvement, as the case of tourism may show.

Because of the western ideological values placed by the prostitutes' clients – significantly western tourists – on sexuality, prostitutes are able to command a relatively high price for their services, and thereby maintain their new and required relative high value of input to the family.

Other forms of "work" incorporated into or as a result of capitalist penetration in the Philippine case are overseas marriages by Filipinas to foreigners, and overseas employment by both males and females in such places as Germany and Saudi Arabia. The input to family income in these cases, of course, is contingent upon the workers remitting or investing funds back home.

[7]This differs from Notestein's (1945; 1953) argument of "props." The argument asserts that some cultural forces, (e.g., religious doctrines, moral codes, laws, education, community customs, marriage habits, and family organisations), obscure the realization that high fertility is not economical or is irrelevant in a changed or changing society (see Caldwell 1982:6 and 117-9, for a brief critique of the argument of "props".) In short, the argument of "props" suggests that the natives suffer from some form of cultural false-consciousness, with regard to fertility at least.

[8]The extended family or "composite" family (Jocano 1975:25) refers to those residing in the one household or adjoining households and acting as a corporate unit in almost all matters and as a unitary grup for consumption and production, and may also at times refer to very close residing bilateral relatives.

[9]As Caldwell (1982; also see Pal 1963 and Scott 1976 for Southeast Asia) says:

> Observers from far more atomised societies often fail to realise the strengths and constraints of village life. There is an intimacy and interdependence in the small traditional community which the observer from the modern society finds difficult to credit. In a world of simple poverty where the possibility of riches and comfort hardly arose but where disasters were frequent and risks to life or to minimal comfort commonplace, it was important that people, especially relatives, should guarantee each other help particularly in times of real need. The emphasis in tropical African and other Third World societies tends to lie more on security and on being guaranteed survival through times of duress than on maximizing the profit in good times.

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